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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has authority to hear this appeal under Utah 
Const., art. VIII, S 3, and Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in concluding that Utah Code 
Ann. S 25-1-11 (repealed 1988), by its language, did not apply to 
transfers of real property? 
Did Walker establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Cavanaughs transferred their real property into a trust 
with fraudulent intent rather than for estate planning purposes? 
Did Walker establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Cavanaughs were insolvent at the time they transferred 
the real property into the trust, or that the truster rendered 
them insolvent? 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S 25-1-4 (repealed 1988) 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation 
incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby ren-
dered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without 
regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made 
or the obligation is incurred without a fair 
consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-7 (repealed 1988) 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation 
incurred, with" actual intent, as distinguished from 
intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud 
either present or future creditors is fraudulent as to 
both present and future creditors. 
Utah Code Ann. S 25-1-11 (repealed 1988) 
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or 
assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or 
things in action made in trust for the use of the per-
son making the same shall be void as against the exist-
ing or subsequent creditors of such person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 
The rule of the common law that statutes in dero-
gation thereof are to be strictly construed has no 
application to the statutes of this state. The stat-
utes establish the laws of this state respecting the 
subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally con-
strued with a view to effect the objects of the stat-
utes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any 
variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of 
equity shall prevail. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The Cavanaughs filed the action below against Walker as 
a fraud and rescission claim in connection with Walker's sale of 
real property to them. One year after the Cavanaughs commenced 
the lawsuit, Walker filed a separate action for foreclosure on a 
purchase money promissory note and trust deed that the Cavanaughs 
had given him in connection with the same transaction. Walker 
ultimately obtained a judgment of foreclosure and then a defi-
ciency judgment. Walker brought a motion in supplemental pro-
ceedings against the Cavanaughs seeking to have the court declare 
void transfers of property to the trust. The court declared the 
transfers of personal property void pursuant to former Utah Code 
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Ann. § 25-1-11 (repealed 1988). The court declined to declare 
the transfer of real property into the Violet Cavanaugh trust 
void. 
B. Statement of Facts 
John and Violet Cavanaugh commenced the action below in 
March 1985 by filing a complaint against Gordon Walker and 
Covecrest Properties seeking in excess of $1.5 million dollars in 
damages on collection of a promissory note, breach of contract, 
fraud, and rescission in connection with a land sales contract. 
R. 1-8. Violet Cavanaugh created the trust in March 1986, prior 
to Gordon Walker initiating his action against the Cavanaughs in 
April 1986. Transcript of hearing dated November 13, 1987 (here-
inafter "Tr."), at 16; R. 407-435. The trust was created for 
estate planning and tax purposes. Tr. at 5-7. The Cavanaughs 
first contemplated creation of the trust in 1982, and began pro-
viding information to their estate planning attorney at that 
time. Tr. at 5-6, 13-15. The trust was not created until March 
1986 because of delays in providing other estate planning infor-
mation to the Cavanaughs1 estate planning attorney. Tr. at 15. 
The creation of the trust did not render the Cavanaughs insol-
vent. Tr. at 16-17. Certain real property of the Cavanaughs was 
never transferred into the trust. Tr. at 4. As an estate plan-
ning vehicle, the trust established a detailed scheme for 
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distribution of trust assets to Mrs. Cavanaugh's family upon her 
death. R. 419-431. 
On April 10, 1986, over one year after the Cavanaughs 
filed their action against Walker, and after creation of the 
trust, Walker filed a separate lawsuit (Civil No. C86-2728) 
against the Cavanaughs. (See Appellant's Brief at 8.) The two 
actions were subsequently consolidated.- R. 99-100. 
A judgment of foreclosure was entered in favor of 
Walker in May 1987. R. 339-345. Following a Sheriff's Sale, a 
substantial deficiency judgment was entered against the 
Cavanaughs in August 1987. R. 372-374. Walker brought a motion 
in supplemental proceedings against John and Violet Cavanaugh 
seeking a declaration that the transfers of property to the Vio-
let Cavanaugh trust were void in their entirety. R. 405-450. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Walker is precluded from raising Utah Code Ann. S 
25-1-4 and the invalidity for spendthrift trust provisions for 
the first time on appeal. The standard of proof for a fraudulent 
conveyance is clear and convincing evidence. The record does not 
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence with respect 
2/ Walker did not counterclaim in the Cavanaughs1 action 
against him even though Walker's claim arose directly from 
the transaction upon which the Cavanaughs were suing. For 
some reason, the record does not contain Walker's complaint 
in the subsequent action, Civil No. C86-2728. 
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to the insolvency of the Cavanaughs or actual fraudulent intent 
in making a transfer. Former Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11 was lim-
ited by its terms to personal property. Extension of an express 
statutory provision to cover real property would be improper 
judicial legislation. The trial court properly distinguished 
between personal property and real property in making its deci-
sion. Former Section 25-1-11 permitted the trial court to avoid 
such a transfer into trust by a settlor for his or her own bene-
fit without regard to actual intent or insolvency. Walker failed 
to meet the burden of proof with respect to the transfer of real 
property. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 25-1-4 DOES NOT APPLY. 
A. Walker Is Precluded From Raising § 25-1-4 On Appeal 
Because He Did Not Raise The Issue Below. 
The first section of argument in Walker's brief argues 
that the trial court should have invalidated the transfer of real 
property to the Violet P. Cavanaugh Family Trust under former 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-4. Appellant's Brief at 13-15. 
Walker did not assert Section 25-1-4 before as a basis for inval-
idating the transfer. See R. 392-404. 
Issues not presented to the trial court are not 
reviewable on appeal as a basis for reversing the decision of the 
lower court. Traynor v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984); 
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Banqerter v. Poultonf 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983). Having failed to 
argue the application of former Section 25-1-4 to the trial 
court, Walker is precluded from asserting it for the first time 
on appeal. 
B. The Record Does Not Reflect That Violet Cavanauqh Was 
Insolvent At The Time Of The Creation Of The Trust. 
Even assuming arguendo that Walker had raised the issue 
of Section 25-1-4 in the trial court, it would not provide a 
basis for reversal because John and Violet Cavanaugh were not 
insolvent or rendered insolvent at the time of the creation of 
the family trust. Former Section 25-1-4 provided: 
A very conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, 
by a person which is, or will be thereby rendered, 
insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard 
to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the 
obligation incurred without a fair consideration. 
Utah Code Ann. S 25-1-4 (repealed 1988) (emphasis added). A 
party challenging a conveyance as fraudulent has the burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Furniture Manufacturers 
Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Eames, 
30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974). Walker failed to meet 
the burden of proof. 
In order to prove insolvency by clear and convincing 
evidence, Ma fact and figure balancing of assets and liabilities 
must be considered. . . . Only a showing that the debtor's 
entire nonexempt property and assets are insufficient to pay his 
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debts rises to the level of insolvency." Furniture Manufacturers 
Sales, Inc. v. Deamery 680 P.2d at 400. Where the assets and 
liabilities are not balanced, "it [is] impossible to show by 
clear and convincing evidence" that a debtor was insolvent. Id. 
Judge Rokich made no findings on the question of insol-
vency. R. 331-337. Walker attempts to circumvent the insuffi-
ciency of evidence on insolvency by arguing that the Cavanaughs 
"transferred all their assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, 
. . . and filed bankruptcy due to insolvency as a result of Walk-
er's large judgment." Brief of Appellants at 14. In fact, the 
creation of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust in March 1987 did not 
render the Cavanaughs insolvent. John Cavanaugh testified that 
the transfer of assets to the trust did not render the Cavanaughs 
insolvent. Tr. at 16-17. The evidence also indicated that the 
Cavanaughs retained certain property, including real property 
located in California, outside of the trust. Id. at 4. No other 
evidence was presented on the issue. 
No balance sheet evidence of insolvency was presented 
to the trial court. It was therefore "impossible" for the trial 
court to find insolvency by clear and convincing evidence. 
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II. THE FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT AN INFERENCE OF FRAUDULENT INTENT, 
The facts that were presented to the trial court do not 
support an inference that Cavanaughs transferred the real prop-
erty into trust with actual fraudulent intent. Utah Code Ann. § 
25-1-7 provides that a conveyance made "with actual intent" to 
hinder, delay or defraud creditors is fraudulent and therefore, 
void. Dahnken, Inc. of Salt Lake v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1986) held that a court may infer actual fraudulent intent from 
the present of certain indicta of fraud. 726 P.2d at 423. While 
actual fraud may be "inferred" in certain instances, the burden 
of proof remains by clear and convincing evidence. See Territo-
rial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989)("actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence"). The record in 
this case does not indicate that Judge Rokich erred in finding no 
actual fraudulent intent in connection with the transfer of the 
real property. While there may have been evidence of some fac-
tors considered in an indicia of fraud analysis, the record does 
not support a finding of actual fraudulent intent by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Walker's argument that the conveyance satisfied the 
"anticipation of litigation" indicia of fraud set forth in the 
Dahnken case is not supported by the record. The Cavanaughs, 
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rather than Walker, commenced this action. The Cavanaughs fully 
believed that it was Walker who was indebted to them, rather than 
they indebted to Walker. Tr. at 16. Walker had attempted to 
evade service of process and filed repeated motions to quash ser-
vice of process in the Cavanaughs' action. R. 9-10; 51-53; 
89-90. There was no evidence that the Cavanaughs anticipated 
Walker filing a separate action at the time the trust was cre-
ated. The transfer of the property into trust was made for tax 
and estate planning purposes. Tr. at 5-6. The Cavanaughs con-
templated creating the estate planning trust since 1982, and had 
consoled with their estate planning lawyer off and on since that 
time. Id. 
Walker attempts to bring matters outside of the record 
before this court in an attempt to reverse Judge Rokich's deci-
sion by citing to a title report attached as an exhibit to a 
stipulation for the sale of real property in the Cavanaughs' 
bankruptcy as "another indication of fraudulent intent by the 
Cavanaughs in this case." Appellant's brief at 18. The bank-
ruptcy stipulation and title report were not before the trial 
court in this case and should therefore not be considered in 
reviewing the decision of the trial court. Further, the court 
should not give credence to the unsupported assertions of Walker 
that the beneficiaries of the trust deeds were "insiders." There 
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is simply no evidence before this court, nor was there evidence 
before the trial court, as to whether the beneficiaries were 
insiders of the Cavanaughs for the purpose of the transactions or 
the amount of consideration involved. 
The legitimate tax and estate planning purposes of the 
trust undermine any inference of actual fraud in connection with 
the creation of the trust. Walker failed to show actual fraud by 
clear and convincing evidence. Judge Rokich properly refused to 
find actual fraud. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF FORMER UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 25-1-11 WAS 
EXPRESSLY LIMITED TO PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
Walker argues that this court should expand the scope 
of former Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-11 to include real property. 
That section allowed avoidance of a transfer of personal property 
to a trust without a showing of insolvency, fraudulent intent, or 
other usual indicia of fraud necessary to avoid other types of 
transfers. 
As this court has previously noted, Section 25-1-11 
"relates only to 'goods, chattels, or things in action,1 which in 
any sense of the terms are not real property." Geary v. Cain, 79 
Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396 (1932). The attempt to characterize the 
Geary v. Cain holding as dictum, and Walker's claim that Geary v. 
Cain did not involve the issue of a conveyance to a trust, are 
inaccurate. The creditor in Geary v. Cain argued that the trust 
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company held legal title for the benefit of the grantorc The 
argument was "but another way of saying that the corporation is a 
trustee, holding the legal title to real property, the equitable 
title to which is in Cain, who is the cestui que trust." 9 P.2d 
at 398 The court's decision was directly on point. 
The express language of Section 25-1-11 controls over 
any inconsistencies with common law. See Hansen v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982)(in event of conflict 
between common law and express provision of statute, statute pre-
vails); Utah Code Ann. S 68-3-2. While Section 25-1-11 was in 
effect, its limitation of the common law principle to personal 
property therefore controlled. The trial court correctly held 
that Section 25-1-11 did not apply to the transfer of the real 
property into the Violet Cavanaugh trust. 
IV. THE CAVANAUGHS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE ABOUT TO INCUR 
DEBTS BEYOND THEIR ABILITY TO PAY THEM. 
Walker argues, apparently for the first time on appeal, 
that Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-6 also applied to make the transfer an 
avoidable fraudulent conveyance. The sole basis for Walker's 
argument is his unsupported assertion that the Cavanaughs knew 
that Walker was about to obtain a judgment against them on their 
purchase money note. Appellant's Brief at 24. Contrary to Walk-
er's assertion, the Cavanaughs did not believe that they were 
about to incur debts beyond which they had the ability to repay. 
11 
As noted above, it was the Cavanaughs who initiated the lawsuit 
against Walker, The suit had been pending for sometime before 
Walker filed his separate lawsuit. During that time, Walker had 
attempted to avoid service of process and had filed numerous 
motions to quash service of process. R. 9-10; 51-59; 89-97. The 
Cavanaughs did not believe that Walker would prevail on his then 
unasserted claim against them. Tr. at 16. The trust was an 
estate planning vehicle which was created with a legitimate 
purpose. 
There is no evidence sufficient to support a finding on 
clear and convincing evidence that the Cavanaughs were about to 
incur, or believe they were about to incur, debts beyond their 
ability to repay them. The decision of the trial court should 
not be reversed on the grounds of Utah Code Ann. S 25-1-6. 
V* WALKER DID NOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE SPENDTHRIFT 
PROVISIONS BELOW. 
Walker is precluded from challenging for the first time 
on appeal the conveyance of the real property to the trust on the 
basis of the spendthrift provisions. See Traynor v. Cushinq, 688 
P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). Further, even if the issue was properly 
before this court, Walker's argument fails because it is only the 
spendthrift provision that is unenforceable, not the entire 
trust. Walker argues on appeal that the trial court's decision 
should be reversed because a spendthrift provision of a trust 
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cannot be enforced against creditors of a beneficiary who was 
also the grantor. Appellants Brief at 25-30. Walker did not ask 
the trial court to permit him to execute on Mrs. Cavanaugh's ben-
eficial interest in the trust property. Instead, Walker sought a 
declaration that the entire trust was void. Under the authorities 
Walker cites, it is not the entire trust that is void in such a 
situation, only "any restraints in the instrument on the involun-
tary alienation of his interest." Nelson v. California Trust 
Co., 33 Cal. 2d 501, 202 P.2d 1021 (1949). 
The settlor of a trust can be a beneficiary. A. Scott, 
The Law of Trusts S 114 (4th ed. 1987). A "trust is not invali-
dated merely because the trustor names himself as a beneficiary 
during his life. Estate of Overmire, 58 Wash. App. 531, 794 P.2d 
518, 520 (1990). In the Nelson v. California Trust Co. case, a 
creditor brought a proceeding against a trust seeking to attach 
the trust interest of the seller/beneficiary. The Nelson court 
did not invalidate the trust, as Walker seeks to do in the 
instant case. Rather, the court allowed the judgment creditor to 
attach the interest of the beneficiary in the trust notwithstand-
ing the trust's spendthrift provisions. 
If Walker had brought a proceeding against the trust 
and sought to attach the trust property, Walker may have been 
able to reach the interest of Violet Cavanaugh in the trust, 
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notwithstanding the spendthrift provisions. Walker would not 
have been entitled to an order declaring the entire trust void. 
Walker failed to argue the spendthrift trust issue before the 
trial court in any form, let alone through an attempt to attach 
Violet Cavanaugh's interest in the trust. The decision of the 
trial court refusing to declare the trust void should be 
affirmed. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AVOIDED ONLY THE TRANSFER OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY TO THE TRUST. 
Former Section 25-1-11 allowed a conveyance of person-
alty to a trust for the benefit of the settlor to be, set aside 
without regard to the actual intent of the transferor or the 
transferor1s insolvency. The statute does not apply to real 
property. To avoid the transfers of real property to the trust, 
Walker had the burden of proving actual fraudulent intent and 
insolvency by clear and convincing evidence. See Furniture Manu-
facturer Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1984). 
Walker failed to meet his burden of proof. The trial court prop-
erly avoided the transfer of the personalty without regard to 
intent or insolvency pursuant to former Section 25-1-11. The 
trial court's decision to differentiate between the personalty 
and realty was mandated by statute. This court should affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision is supported by the law and 
the factual record. This court should affirm the decision below. 
DATED this day of September, 1991. 
Doughs J A 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Dennis McGoldrick, 
Chapter 7 Trustee for the Estate 
of John and Violet Cavanaugh 
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